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n recent years, monetary policymakers have monitored several meas-
ures of market expectations of future inflation. One of these
measures is based on the yield differential between nominal and
inflation indexed Treasury securities. This yield spread is also called the
“breakeven inflation rate.” An increase in the breakeven rate is some-
times viewed as a sign that market inflation expectations may be on the
rise. For example, the FOMC frequently refers to the yield spread as a
measure of “inflation compensation” and considers the yield spread an
indicator of inflation expectations in policy deliberations.
1
Accurately inferring market expectations of inflation from yield
spreads is difficult. The difficulty lies in the differences in market liquid-
ity conditions between nominal and inflation indexed Treasury
securities. This article presents evidence that liquidity differences
between nominal and inflation indexed Treasuries have been nontrivial.
Consequently, simply attributing changes in yield spreads to changes in
market inflation expectations and ignoring the liquidity risk premium
could lead to overstated inflation expectations. 
Pu Shen is a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City. Jonathan
Corning, an associate economist at the bank, helped prepare the article. The article is
on the bank’s website at www.KansasCityFed.org.
29The first section of the article gives a brief overview of inflation
indexed Treasury securities, the components of the yields of both
nominal and indexed Treasuries, and their yield spreads. The second
section examines the behavior of the yield spreads over the past few
years and explains why changes of the liquidity risk premium have
likely played an important role in the changes of the yield spreads. This
section also provides some estimates of the changes in the liquidity risk
premia during the past seven years and argues that ignoring such
changes may lead to erroneous inferences of inflation expectations. 
I. INFLATION INDEXED TREASURY SECURITIES
AND COMPONENTS OF THE YIELD SPREADS
This section discusses the main features of inflation indexed Trea-
sury securities, which are commonly referred to as TIPS. Next, it
examines the components of the yields of nominal securities and TIPS.
Finally, it identifies the conditions needed to obtain useful information
about market inflation expectations directly from the yield spreads. 
TIPS and their markets
The U.S. Treasury began issuing TIPS in 1997. Initially called Trea-
sury Inflation Protected Securities, their official name was later changed
to Treasury Inflation Indexed Securities (TIIS). Market participants
have continued to call the instruments TIPS.
The first TIPS had a maturity of ten years. Every year since 1997,
Treasury has issued additional 10-year TIPS. TIPS with 5-year, 20-year,
and 30-year maturities have also been issued intermittently. In Decem-
ber 2005, a total of $329 billion TIPS were outstanding, accounting for
about 7.9 percent of the $4.2 trillion in outstanding marketable Trea-
sury securities. Of Treasuries issued with at least two years’ maturity,
TIPS account for 10.3 percent.
2
The main advantage of TIPS over conventional nominal securities is
that TIPS investors are not exposed to inflation risk.
3The coupon rate of
a TIPS is fixed in real terms at auction, and the dollar value of the prin-
cipal grows with inflation over the life of the TIPS. The real return,
which is measured by purchasing power, does not vary with inflation. 
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In contrast, the coupon payments and the principal of a nominal
Treasury security are fixed in dollar terms. Thus, the purchasing power,
or real return, of a nominal Treasury declines as inflation rises.
4
Components of nominal Treasury yields 
To investors, the real rate of return, or real yield, of an investment is
important because it measures the result of the investment in terms of
purchasing power.
5 The yield of a nominal Treasury contains three main
components: the real yield, the yield that is equal to the expected rate of
average inflation for the remaining life of the Treasury, and the inflation
risk premium (which compensates investors for the risk that the actual
inflation rate over the life of the Treasury may be higher than expected).
6
For example, in the following equation, yt
n,10 denotes the yield of a







10 is the average real yield investors require to lend to the U.S.
Treasury for ten years at time t, πt
e,10 is the expected average inflation
rate for the next ten years, and RPt
10(π)is the inflation risk premium for
the nominal Treasury with ten years to maturity.
7
If investors did not mind inflation risk, then the yield of a 10-year
nominal Treasury would simply be the sum of the required real rate for
lending to the Treasury for ten years and the expected average inflation





Because inflation erodes the purchasing power of nominal pay-
ments, the relevant yield to investors is not the nominal yield, but the
real yield. For example, assume investors decide that 2 percent real yield
is a reasonable return for lending to the U.S. Treasury for the next ten
years. If they collectively forecast that the average inflation rate for the
next ten years will be about 2.5 percent, then equation (2) suggests that
the nominal yield on a conventional 10-year Treasury would be 4.5
percent. If, instead, most investors believed that average inflation would
be 3 percent for the next ten years, then the nominal yield of the 10-
year Treasury would have to rise to 5 percent to attract investors. 
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In reality, most investors would rather avoid the risk of inflation.
Therefore, the yield of a nominal Treasury must be a bit higher than the
simple sum of the required real yield and the expected inflation rate.
The additional yield, RPt
10(π), is to compensate investors for bearing
the inflation risk. 
Components of TIPS yields
The yield of an inflation indexed security usually consists of two
components: a real yield and a liquidity risk premium to compensate
investors for the risk of having to pay more (than in the case of nominal
Treasuries) to liquidate the TIPS before its maturity.
8 Thus, if yt
i,10is the
yield on a TIPS with ten years to maturity, then:
(3) yt




10 is the real yield required by investors to lend to the Trea-
sury at t, and RPt
10(l) is the liquidity risk premium included in the
TIPS yield.
Generally speaking, the liquidity risk of a security is that investors
may incur large costs to buy or sell the security in a secondary market. In
Treasury markets, an investor may need to make portfolio adjustments
after the initial auction or before the maturity of a Treasury security, and
thus is forced to buy or sell the security in the secondary market. As a
result, investors need to consider the likely costs associated with such
trading. Some of the costs are similar for both nominal Treasuries and
TIPS, such as brokerage fees and commissions, and thus are not impor-
tant to the current discussion. Other costs relate to the ease and
convenience of trading, which are more uncertain in nature and usually
relate inversely to the liquidity of the market. For example, a seller of a
large amount of nominal Treasury securities, say $2 billion, may be able
to find a buyer and complete the transaction in minutes. Selling $2
billion worth of TIPS may require a lot more time to search for a buyer
or selling at somewhat lower prices to complete the sale in a timely
fashion. As most investors need to adjust their portfolios at some point
due to unforeseen events, the risk of having to pay a cost for the liquid-
ity is ever present. Since the probability of incurring large liquidity costs
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is inversely related to the liquidity of the security, the less liquid security
carries higher liquidity risk, and thus must carry a higher yield to attract
investors. This additional yield is the liquidity risk premium.
The liquidity risk premium generally tends to increase during finan-
cial market crises because investors’ needs to quickly adjust their portfolios
tend to increase during crises, making investors’ tolerance for liquidity risk
decline. In a financial market crisis, investors typically exhibit a pattern of
“flight to quality” and stay away from less liquid assets. 
The market for nominal U.S. Treasuries is the most liquid debt
market and thus is usually considered the benchmark for market liquid-
ity. Relative to nominal Treasuries, almost all other financial
instruments are likely to carry some liquidity risk and liquidity risk
premia because their markets are not as liquid. In particular, TIPS are
relatively new in the United States, and their market liquidity was ini-
tially quite low. Consequently, early TIPS likely carried a sizable
liquidity risk premium. As the market expanded and liquidity
improved, the liquidity risk premium has undoubtedly declined.
Nonetheless, it may still be too soon to believe that the liquidity risk
premium has disappeared or even stabilized.
Yield spreads and inflation expectations
Many market participants and policymakers are interested in the
yield spreads between nominal Treasuries and TIPS because the spreads
contain information about market expected future inflation rates. The
yield spread between a nominal Treasury and a TIPS can be calculated
from equations (1) and (3). From the earlier discussion, it is straightfor-
ward to see that the yield spread should be equal to the market expected
rate of inflation, plus an inflation risk premium, and minus a liquidity
risk premium.
9 For example, using St
10 to indicate the yield spread














e,10 is the expected average annual inflation rate for the next
ten years, RPt
10(π) is the inflation risk premium for the 10-year
nominal Treasury, and RPt
10(l) is the liquidity risk premium for the 10-
year TIPS.
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Similarly, the yield spread between 5-year nominal Treasuries and







e,5 is the market expected average inflation rate for the next
five years, and RPt
5(π) and RPt
5(l) are the inflation and liquidity risk
premium for the respective Treasuries.
In each of the two yield spreads shown in equations (4) and (5),
there is a term for expected inflation over the life of the security. That
is, πt
e,10 represents average inflation expected by investors for the next
ten years, while πt
e,5 represents average inflation expected for the next
five years. 
For some purposes, it is useful to obtain a measure of longer-term
inflation expectations. For example, policymakers may be interested in
the average inflation rate expected by investors over a longer-term
horizon. One such measure is the average inflation rate for the five-
year period five years ahead (πt
e,5f ). This measure, unlike the five-year
and ten-year expected inflation discussed above, removes the effect of
near term inflation expectation and thus gives policymakers a better
picture of where inflation is likely to be in the more distant future. A
value for πt
e,5f can be easily derived from the 5-year and 10-year
expected inflation rates: 
(6) πt
e,5f = 2*πt
e,10  – πt
e,5.
Using the two yield spreads St
5  and St
10, one can construct a St
5f, rep-























In equation (8), the first component of St
5fis the expected average
inflation rate for the five-year period five years ahead, the second
component is the inflation risk premium differential between the 10-
year and 5-year nominal Treasury securities, and the third component
is the liquidity risk premium differential between the 10-year and 5-
year TIPS.
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Information about expected future inflation rates in yield spreads
Most market analysts have focused on the component of expected
inflation in the yield spread. In particular, if one is willing to assume
that inflation and liquidity risk premia are constant over a particular
period, then changes in the yield spreads for the period mostly reflect
changes in the inflation expectation of market participants.
12 Further,
under the same assumption that both inflation and liquidity risk premia
are constant, then changes in St
5f will solely reflect changes in the
expected average inflation rate for the 5-year period five years ahead. 
For policymakers and some market participants, the separation of
the expected future inflation rate and inflation risk premium may be of
secondary importance, especially regarding long-term inflation expec-
tations, such as πt
e,5f and πt
e,10. The average inflation rates for the long
term should be most closely related to monetary policymakers’ view of
the desirable level of inflation and their credibility. Therefore, some
market commentators also use them as proxies for the FOMC infla-
tion-fighting credibility. In this context, separating the long-term
expected inflation rate from the inflation risk premium is unimpor-
tant. In fact, the sum of the expected inflation rate and inflation risk
premium better represents market participants’ view of inflationary
pressure. For example, if the sum for the next ten years has declined
0.5 percentage point, then the decline could be due to a 0.5-percent-
age-point decline in the expected average inflation rate by market
participants, to a 0.5-percentage-point decline in the inflation risk
premium, or to a combined total decline of 0.5 percentage point in
both the expected inflation rate and the inflation risk premium. What-
ever the precise cause, it would represent an improvement of FOMC
inflation-fighting credibility.
In summary, changes in the yield spreads over a particular period
can be useful proxies for changes in market inflation expectations,
under the crucial assumption that the liquidity risk premia in TIPS are
constant for the period. The next section examines the liquidity risk
premium in detail to assess the likelihood of this assumption. 
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II. THE LIQUIDITY RISK PREMIUM
A closer look at the liquidity risk premium in TIPS suggests that it
is relatively large and has changed considerably in recent years. Conse-
quently, taking account of the liquidity risk premium greatly
complicates the task of extracting information from the yield spreads
about market inflation expectations.
Large and variable liquidity risk premium 
Comparing actual yield spreads with other measures of inflation
expectations for the sample period of 1999 to early 2006 suggests that
liquidity risk premia have been large for most of the sample period.
13
Further, they were sometimes quite variable and have likely declined
over time.
Chart 1 shows the yield spreads between 5-year nominal and
indexed Treasuries, as well as the Blue Chip Consensus forecast for the
average inflation rate for the next five years from January 1999 to Feb-
ruary 2006. It also shows the actual average inflation rates for the
five-year periods ahead from January 1999 to March 2001 (the latest
month such calculation is feasible). 
Chart 2 shows the yield spreads between 10-year nominal and
indexed Treasuries, as well as the forecasts of the average inflation rates
for the next ten years based on the Blue Chip Consensus forecast, and
on the Survey of Professional Forecasters (SPF).
14
Three observations are immediate from these two charts. First, the
liquidity risk premia were likely sizable for most of the sample period.
During the first five years of the sample, the yield spreads were mostly
well below the expected inflation rate based on Blue Chip Consensus or
SPF. In the case of five-year spreads, it is also clear that, for the three year
period that data are available, the Blue Chip Consensus was very close to
the actual five-year average inflation, while the yield spreads were mostly
well below actual inflation rates for the respective periods. There is no
reason to suspect that the expected inflation rate in the yield spread would
be systematically lower than survey-based measures or would consistently
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Chart 1
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underpredict actual inflation. The most likely explanation is that the liq-
uidity risk premia in the yields of the TIPS were larger than the inflation
risk premia in nominal Treasuries during this period.
15
Subtracting the expected inflation rate of the Blue Chip Consensus
forecasts from the 10-year yield spreads reveals that the average differ-
ence was negative 0.55 percentage point for the first five years of the
sample period. In other words, from 1999 to 2003, the liquidity risk
premium in 10-year TIPS was, on average, 0.55-percentage-point
higher than the inflation risk premium in 10-year nominal Treasuries.
This observation may not surprise active market participants, who
usually consider market liquidity conditions an important factor in
making buying and selling decisions. It may surprise other market
observers, however, who tend to consider the liquidity risk premium to
be of secondary importance to the inflation risk premium.
16
The second observation is that liquidity risk premia are likely to be
quite variable. Unlike survey-based inflation expectations that are only
updated quarterly or semiannually, yield spreads are derived from
trading prices and thus available whenever bond markets are open.
Consequently, it is natural that inflation expectations reflected in the
yield spread may vary more frequently. Nevertheless, it is highly
improbable that the observed magnitudes of the variations are mostly
due to changes in market inflation expectations. For example, for the
entire sample period, the survey-based expected inflation rate varied
within a narrow range of 0.4 percentage point, while for 10-year Trea-
suries the total variation of the yield spread was within a range of about
1.5 percentage points and for 5-year Treasuries almost two percentage
points. Such large magnitudes of changes in the yield spread are
unlikely to be mainly due to large swings in the expected future infla-
tion rate and inflation risk premium, given the very subdued
movements in the survey-based forecasts of future inflation. Large
changes in liquidity risk premia have likely contributed to these sizable
movements in the yield spreads. 
Third, liquidity risk premia in TIPS have likely declined in recent
years. In both Charts 1 and 2, the yield spreads were mostly below the
survey forecasts of future inflation rate before 2004 (and the realized
average inflation rate in the 5-year case), but mostly above the survey
forecasts after 2004. Both yield spreads started the sample period more
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than one percentage point below the corresponding survey forecasts of
future inflation. In other words, the liquidity premia in TIPS were at
least one whole percentage point larger than the inflation risk premia in
nominal Treasuries. Since early 2004, neither spread has been more
than 0.15 percentage point below the survey forecasts of inflation, indi-
cating that the liquidity risk premia were close to the size of inflation
premia. It is possible that such movements can be due entirely to large
increases in inflation risk premia. But this scenario is highly improbable
given the fact that survey forecasts of future inflation rates barely moved
for the entire sample period. A more plausible explanation is that at
least part of the changes was caused by decreases in the liquidity risk
premia in TIPS. 
The likely decline of liquidity risk premium in TIPS
One reason that the liquidity risk premium in TIPS is likely to
have declined during the sample period is that the market for TIPS
deepened considerably during this time. Chart 3 shows the issuance
of TIPS relative to nominal Treasuries with similar maturities for
each fiscal year since 1997. The gray bars in the chart are the ratios
of newly issued TIPS to nominal Treasuries with maturities of five
or ten years. The black bars are the ratios of TIPS to nominal Trea-
suries with maturities of ten to 30 years.
17 By fiscal year 2005, the
issuance volume of TIPS with maturities of at least ten years was
more than 50 percent of the total issuance volume of nominal Trea-
suries with maturities of at least ten years. Clearly, the newly issued
TIPS markets have become more comparable to the nominal Trea-
sury markets. 
Market interest and TIPS trading have also grown considerably.
TIPS have gained the interest of pension funds, insurance companies,
direct individual investors, and, since late 2003, the interest of
exchange-traded funds. In 1999, only a handful of mutual funds
focused on TIPS. Today, there are many more such funds. Chart 4
shows the transaction volumes of TIPS through primary dealers who
regularly participate in Treasury security auctions.
18 Trends in overall
trading volumes in TIPS should be closely related to the trading volume
that goes through primary dealers, which has gradually increased. 
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The deepening market for TIPS is likely to be associated with a
decline of the liquidity risk premium for TIPS for two reasons. One,
as the market deepens, it is easier for investors to find a counter-
party to buy a TIPS after its initial auction or to sell a TIPS before
its maturity. That is, the deeper market has improved the market
liquidity for TIPS and reduced liquidity risk. Less liquidity risk, in
turn, has led investors to require a smaller liquidity risk premium
for TIPS. 
The other reason that a deepening market may lead to lower liq-
uidity risk premium is that it reduces the uncertainty regarding
future market liquidity. When TIPS were new to the U.S. market,
participants were uncertain about whether or not the Treasury
would remain committed to the program. Earlier in the sample
period, some investors might have worried that the Treasury would
decide to stop issuing TIPS, which would have quickly dried up
trading in existing TIPS, leading to deteriorated market liquidity.
But as the TIPS market continues to deepen, the risk of a sudden
disappearance of the market declines, which in turn should lessen
the liquidity risk premium.
Growth of the TIPS markets has not occurred uniformly. In fact,
it is possible that 10-year TIPS may have become more liquid than 5-
year TIPS because of Treasury’s differing commitment to the two
securities. Treasury has issued 10-year TIPS every year since the TIPS
program began in 1997. The 5-year TIPS, in contrast, were issued in
1997 and 1998, but then not again until 2005. This changing pattern
of issuance was related partly to overall changes in the Treasury
market: The federal government ran a budget surplus from 1998 to
2001, which reduced its need to borrow and allowed suspension of
the 5-year and 30-year TIPS programs. Since 2002, the budget deficit
has come back decisively. In response, Treasury has steadily increased
total TIPS issuance, reissuing the 5-year TIPS and introducing a 20-
year TIPS (Chart 5).
In addition to improving market liquidity, another general develop-
ment may have also helped lower the TIPS liquidity risk premium.
Over the sample period, investors in general may have become less
worried about liquidity risk. Liquidity risk premia should generally be
lower if investors become more tolerant to liquidity risk, even if the
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magnitudes of the risk are unchanged.
19 The sample period began in
1999, shortly after the financial market crisis in the fall of 1998. That
particular crisis was partly characterized by heightened demand for the
most liquid assets—nominal Treasuries. The liquidity risk premia on
many other assets increased. Thus, the financial crisis likely had a lin-
gering effect on the new TIPS markets by leaving investors deeply
concerned about liquidity risk. 
With the passing of time, various risk management measures have
been adopted gradually, both in market structures and in many invest-
ment firms. It also appears that over the years investors have become
more tolerant of liquidity risks. Chart 6 shows the yield difference
between off-the-run and on-the-run 10-year nominal Treasuries. On-
the-run Treasuries are the most recently auctioned Treasuries and thus
are typically traded more frequently. Off-the-run Treasuries are those
that were auctioned one or more auctions earlier, and thus most of
them are already settled in investors’ portfolios and traded less fre-
quently. Therefore, the main difference between these nominal
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Treasuries is their market liquidity. On-the-run Treasuries are more
liquid, and the yield difference between the two securities is the liquid-
ity risk premium.
20
Chart 6 shows that the yield difference between the off-the-run
and on-the-run nominal Treasuries has generally declined over the
sample period. As the nominal Treasury market was already highly
developed at the beginning of the sample period and the relative liq-
uidity between on-the-run and off-the-run 10-year Treasuries has
not changed materially, this yield difference mainly reflects
investors’ tolerance of liquidity risks in general, which has evidently
become greater.
Estimating changes in the liquidity risk premium
With three components in yield spreads, it is difficult to directly
estimate the component of liquidity premium. To this end, we first con-
struct a variable, called Risk Premia Differentials (RPD), which are the
difference of the yield spread and the Blue Chip Consensus inflation
Chart 6
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forecast for the respective horizon. Under the assumption that the con-
sensus forecast follows the same process generating expected inflation
rates in the yield spreads, then RPD is the difference between the infla-
tion risk premium and the liquidity risk premium. Implicitly, this
assumes that the expected inflation rates built into the yields of Trea-
suries are essentially the same as the Blue Chip Consensus forecasts.
While this may be true on average, long-term Blue Chip Consensus
forecasts are only updated semiannually, and therefore some of the
changes in the expected rates of inflation may have been left in the
RPDs and grouped with the inflation risk premium. 
As RPDs have two risk premia, neither of which is directly observ-
able, it remains a difficult task to ascertain changes to each individual
component from changes of RPDs. It may be possible to estimate
changes in the liquidity risk premium, however, by recognizing that the
determinants of the liquidity risk premium and the inflation risk
premium are very different. As discussed above, the depth of the TIPS
market and investors’ general tolerance of liquidity risks are closely
related to the liquidity risk premium in TIPS, but are unlikely to be
directly linked with the inflation risk premium in nominal Treasuries.
Therefore, these variables can be used to estimate the contribution of
changes in liquidity risk premium to the changes in the RPDs. 
Specifically, we assume that the following statistical model is a








where  ∆ indicates changes of the variables;
21 RPDt
10 is the risk
premium differential for 10-year Treasuries at time t; ratiot is the ratio
of total outstanding TIPS issued at a maturity of five or ten years to
nominal Treasuries issued at maturities of two to ten years;
22 volumet is
the logarithm of the transaction volume of all TIPS with primary
dealers;
23 spreadt is the yield spread between off-the-run and on-the-
run nominal 10-year Treasuries; and ut
10 is the residual, which
includes both changes in the inflation risk premium in the 10-year
nominal Treasury (could be different by a constant) and errors that are
due to other factors.
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Equation (9) provides a base for regression analysis as long as factors
influencing changes in the inflation risk premium are unrelated to
factors influencing the liquidity risk premium, which seems reasonable,
as ratiot is determined by the Treasury and thus can be viewed as exoge-
nous to the inflation process. The variables spreadt and volumet are not
as clearly exogenous as ratiot, as it is possible that views about future
inflation risk may lead investors to change their trading patterns regard-
ing nominal and inflation indexed Treasuries. Yet, it seems reasonable to
conjecture that such consideration would be secondary.
Chart 7 shows the estimated changes of liquidity risk premia for the
5-year TIPS (dashed line) and 10-year TIPS (solid line). For example,








estimated coefficients. That is, the solid line in Chart 7 is the cumulative
of the estimated changes of liquidity risk premium for the sample
period. The dashed line in Chart 7 is obtained similarly, with the regres-
sion on corresponding five-year RPDs.
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Jan-99 Jul-99 Jan-00 Jul-00 Jan-01 Jul-01 Jan-02 Jul-02 Jan-03 Jul-03 Jan-04 Jul-04 Jan-05 Jul-05 Jan-06
Source: Author’s calculations46 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
For the solid line in Chart 7, the value of each point represents the
relative changes in the liquidity risk premium in the 10-year TIPS rela-
tive to January 1999, and the difference of the values of any two points
reflects changes in the liquidity risk premium between these two dates.
For example, at May 2004, the solid line has a value of -0.14, meaning
that the liquidity premium in 10-year TIPS at that time was 0.14 per-
centage point smaller than the liquidity premium in 10-year TIPS in
January 1999. By February 2006, the solid line has a value of -0.24,
implying that the liquidity premium in 10-year TIPS then was 0.24 per-
centage point smaller than that at January 1999. Consequently, from
May 2004 to February 2006, the liquidity risk premium in 10-year TIPS
declined by 0.1 percentage point (-0.24 minus -0.14 equals -0.10).
The estimates suggest that the liquidity risk premium in TIPS has
indeed declined, but the degree of the decline is smaller for 5-year TIPS
than for 10-year TIPS. Compared with the beginning of 1999, the liq-
uidity premium in 10-year TIPS has declined about 0.24 percentage
point, while the liquidity risk premium in the 5-year TIPS has declined
only 0.08 percentage point.
25 Both liquidity premia declined earlier in
the sample, until the end of 2000. Then they diverged. The liquidity
premium in 5-year TIPS gradually drifted upward for the next two
years and peaked in the fall of 2002. It then declined slightly and has
been relatively stable for the past three years. The liquidity premium of
the 10-year TIPS, in contrast, continued its downward drift until the
spring of 2002, then moved up and stabilized for two years before
resuming its downward trend in the fall of 2004. 
The differing patterns of the two liquidity premia are not surprising
considering the differing patterns of issuance for 5-year and 10-year
TIPS, as discussed earlier (Chart 5). However, both the changes in the
liquidity premia and the differing patterns of changes in the liquidity
premia for 5-year and 10-year TIPS have important implications. They
suggest that ignoring the liquidity risk premium and equating changes
in the yield spread to changes in inflation expectation and inflation risk
premium may lead to erroneous conclusions. 
Let us look at an illustrative example. Table 1 shows how the esti-
mated changes in the sum of expected inflation rate and inflation risk
premium (denoted as the inflation compensation in the table) from
July 2003 to February 2006 vary depending on whether the liquidity
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risk premium is taken into account. In the table, column (1) is
obtained directly from Charts 1 and 7 and equation (5), and column
(2) is obtained from Charts 2 and 7 and equation (4). Column (3) is
derived from columns (1) and (2) based on equations (7) and (8):
column (3)=2*column (2)–column (1). For example, the first
number, 0.06, in column (3) is calculated according to equation (7)
(2*0.58 - 1.10 = 0.06). 
As the liquidity risk premium generally declined during the period,
accounting for changes in the liquidity risk premium leads to smaller
increases in inflation compensation. In particular, while the five-year
breakeven inflation rate five years ahead appears to have drifted up
slightly (0.06 percentage point) during this period, once the changes in
the liquidity risk premium have been taken into account, the sum of
expected inflation rate and inflation risk premium actually edged down
slightly (0.14 percentage point).
Looking forward, the liquidity risk premium may continue to
decline as the markets for TIPS continue to deepen. The above example
shows that ignoring such changes in the liquidity risk premium can lead
to erroneous inferences from yield spreads, as a decline in the liquidity
risk premium may be interpreted as an increase in the market expected
inflation rate or an increase in the inflation risk premium. Further, if 5-
year TIPS are issued more regularly, the liquidity risk premium in their
Table 1
INFERENCE OF INFLATION OUTLOOK DIFFERS WHEN
LIQUIDITY PREMIUM IS TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT
Change for the  Change for the Change for the 5-year
next five years next ten years period five years ahead
(1) (2) (3)
Changes in  1.10 0.58 0.06
yield spreads
Changes in estimated  -0.04 -0.12 -0.20
liquidity premia
Changes in inflation   1.06 0.46 -0.14
compensation when 
liquidity premia 
are accounted for48 FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF KANSAS CITY
yield may decline faster than the liquidity premium in 10-year TIPS,
making it necessary to adjust the derived spread, St
5f, to accurately
reflect changes in the “longer-term inflation expectations.” 
Other factors that may affect yield spreads
In addition to the three fundamental components in yield spreads,
other factors that temporarily influence the demand for and supply of
nominal Treasuries and TIPS may also affect the yield spreads in the
short term, suggesting additional cautions may be called for in inter-
preting changes in the yield spread. In particular, changes in the
demand for and supply of the Treasury debt can lead to changes in
prices, and therefore yields, of the Treasury securities. 
Relative changes in the supply of longer-term nominal Treasuries. All
else being equal, a relative reduction of the supply of longer-term
nominal Treasuries to longer-term TIPS will lead to relatively higher
prices for nominal Treasuries. As yields and prices are inversely related,
this leads to lower yields for nominal Treasuries and therefore to a
smaller yield spread. Similarly, all else being equal, when such a change
is stopped or reversed, the opposite is likely to happen and the yield
spread may increase. This, in fact, is likely to happen in the near future. 
In the past five years, Treasury has decreased the average maturity
of outstanding nominal Treasuries significantly, from its recent peak
in 2001 of about 67 months, to about 48 months in the beginning of
2006–a steep drop of about 30 percent.
26 In the meantime, the rela-
tively new supply of TIPS to nominal Treasuries on the longer end
have increased from about 30 percent from 1998 to 2003 to more
than 50 percent in fiscal year 2005 (Chart 3). If such a shift in supply
had not been accompanied by a similar shift in demand, then it
should have led to a somewhat narrower yield spread as nominal
longer-term Treasuries became more scarce. In contrast, going
forward, the average maturity of nominal Treasuries as well as the rel-
ative supply of TIPS are likely either to stabilize or reverse; thus, the
past downward pressure on the yield spreads will dissipate or reverse
as well, leading to somewhat higher yield spreads. This event should
not be interpreted as an increase in expected inflation rates in the
market or as a higher inflation risk premium. 
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Possible impact from future pension fund reform. Many market
commentators have discussed the potential impact to Treasury
securities markets from possible pension fund reforms. One con-
ceivable change in the regulations regarding pension funds is
related to the matches between assets and liabilities of defined
benefit pension plans. Defined benefit pension plans typically have
long and steady liabilities, which are promised payments to retirees.
In contrast, many of the pension fund investments are either in
assets with shorter durations, such as mortgage-backed securities,
or assets with volatile returns, such as stocks. Therefore, an impor-
tant issue for pension fund regulators is how closely a pension
fund’s assets are matched in cashflow and duration of its liabilities.
But any changes in this regard can potentially alter the demand for
long-term Treasuries, both nominal and inflation indexed. In par-
ticular, it is possible that regulatory changes may affect demand for
nominal and inflation indexed Treasuries differently, leading to
changes in the yield spreads that are unrelated to expected inflation
rates or inflation risk premia.
27
Recent experience in the United Kingdom suggests that the
potential magnitude of the impact to Treasury demand from
pension fund reform can be sizable. In the months after last
October’s release of proposed new regulations regarding UK pension
systems, yields on the nominal 50-year UK government debt securi-
ties declined about 0.4 percentage point, while the yields on the
inflation indexed 50-year UK government debt declined about 0.7
percentage point, widening the yield spread 0.3 percentage point.
Many market commentators suggest that the proposed new regula-
tions, which require closer matches between pension fund assets and
liabilities, have likely contributed to the movements in yields and
yield spreads. 
III. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
The liquidity risk premium in TIPS is an important component of
the yield spread between nominal Treasuries and TIPS. In all likelihood,
from 1999 to 2003 the liquidity risk premium was consistently larger
than the inflation risk premium. As the TIPS market has deepened, the
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liquidity risk premium has generally declined—and is likely to continue
to decline for a while, at least for 5-year TIPS. Consequently, when
evaluating market-expected future inflation rates and inflation risks
from the yield spreads, it is important to consider the impact of possible
changes in the liquidity risk premium. 
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ENDNOTES
1FOMC minutes, March 22, 2005.
2The U.S. Treasury Department maintains a website with much information
regarding TIPS, as well as other Treasury securities. For slightly more theoretical
depiction of the benefits and risks of TIPS, Shen (1998) may be useful.
3Investors in TIPS are free from inflation risk only if they do not have to
pay income tax on the investment income, such as investment made in tax shield
accounts. Otherwise, income tax brings back a portion of the inflation risk
(Shen 1998).
4An example can illustrate the point that TIPS shield investors from inflation
risk, while nominal Treasuries do not. In January 2006, the Treasury auctioned
10-year TIPS with a coupon rate of about 2 percent, and in February, a 10-year
nominal Treasury security with a coupon rate of about 4.5 percent. If an investor
bought the January TIPS at the auction and holds it to maturity, the real return
to the investment will be 2 percent, but the nominal yield will depend on the
actual Consumer Price Index (CPI) inflation rate for the next ten years. If CPI
inflation turns out to average 2.5 percent in the next ten years, the average nom-
inal yield on the TIPS will be 4.5 percent. If instead, inflation turns out to aver-
age 3.5 percent, the investor’s nominal yield will be 5.5 percent. In contrast, the
real return to an investor who bought the February nominal Treasury at auction
will be 2 percent in the first scenario, but only 1 percent in the second scenario.
5As investors may not purchase a Treasury at par and hold it to maturity, the
yield of a Treasury is usually different from its return. Nevertheless, for narrative
simplicity, “yield” and “return” are used interchangeably in this article.
6As the U.S. Treasury Department has never reneged its debt obligations and
is considered by most investors as highly unlikely to do so in the future, the credit
risk and credit risk premium associated with Treasury securities are generally
assumed to be zero. 
7The potential existence of a premium for the risk associated with real inter-
est rates is ignored. Theoretically, the risk of real interest rate fluctuation may be
used by investors to hedge other risks that they are exposed to, and thus the risk
premium may be negligible, if not a discount (Den Haan). Empirically, real yield
curves tend to be much closer to flat, suggesting negligible risk premia associated
with real rate fluctuations. 
8Again, the potential risk premium or discount associated with fluctuations
of the market prevailing real rate of interest is ignored. Some other factors that
may influence TIPS’ yields are also ignored in the current discussion. For exam-
ple, as the dollar payments of TIPS are indexed to the non seasonally adjusted
overall CPI index with a three-month lag, past inflation may affect yields of TIPS
through its impact to the dollar prices of existing TIPS. Another factor that may
influence TIPS’ yields is the probability of deflation. As investors are promised to
receive at least par values of TIPS at maturity, real returns of TIPS are only fixed
if inflation is positive. Under deflation, real returns of TIPS increase. Therefore,
TIPS can be viewed as true “real bonds” combined with an option, the value of
which goes up when the risk of deflation increases.
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9In both charts and statistical analysis presented later, the actual data used are
usually called “breakeven inflation rate (BEI).”Conceptually, these are basically the
same as yield spreads. Technically, they are constructed by finding a future infla-
tion rate that will make the cashflow of a nominal Treasury identical to that of an
indexed Treasury of similar maturity (Sack).
10As the real yields in both nominal and inflation indexed Treasuries reflect
the required rate of return for investors to lend to the federal government, they
ought to be the same for Treasuries with similar maturity. Therefore, the real
yields in the nominal and indexed Treasuries with similar maturity cancel each
other out in the yield spread.
11If the inflation (liquidity) risk premia in the 5-year and 10-year nominal
Treasuries (TIPS) are identical, then the risk differential in the sizes of these two
differential terms in the 5-year spread five years ahead will be identical to these in
the spread between 5-year nominal and inflation indexed Treasuries.
12Alternatively, if changes in the inflation and liquidity risk premia are of the
same direction and magnitude for the period, then they will cancel each other out
exactly, leaving the changes in the yield spread equal to changes in expected infla-
tion rates. In reality, however, this assumption is hard to justify as factors affecting
the inflation risk premium tend to be very different from factors affecting the liq-
uidity risk premium.
13Although the TIPS program started in 1997, the first two years of its exis-
tence were characterized by sparse TIPS and thin trading activity. The yield
spread data used in this article are, therefore, not available until the beginning of
1999, as these are based on the estimated smoothed TIPS yield curve which
requires a decent amount of data about both trading activity and around various
maturity points (Sack).
14Both Blue Chip Consensus and SPF forecasts are the median forecasts of
groups of professional forecasters. Blue Chip Consensus asks forecasters for their
projections of inflation rate for each of the next ten years, from which the author
calculates the average inflation rate for the next five or ten years. SPF directly asks
the group of forecasters their projections of the average rate of inflation for the
next ten years. Both these forecasts are considered reasonably good summaries of
sensible forecasts of future inflation. Studies suggest that most forecasters tend to
be slow in adjusting their expectations when the inflation process turns directions.
But this should not be a serious issue for our sample period (Kozicki and Tinsley).
15Campbell and Shiller provide some estimates of the sizes of inflation risk
premia in nominal Treasuries.
16For example, this author speculated before the inception of TIPS that “even
if there is some difference in (market) liquidity, the difference may not be great
enough to warrant a sizable liquidity premium” (Shen, 1995).
17The bars in the chart are created by combining two or three maturities
together partly because the next longer-term TIPS contribute to the expected
future market liquidity. For example, 10-year TIPS issued in 1997 became 5-year
TIPS in 2002. 
18As there are large month-to-month variations, the volume in Chart 4 is the
3-month moving average of the monthly volume.
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19A liquidity risk premium is roughly the product of a liquidity risk and the
price of such a risk. If investors have become more tolerant to the liquidity risk,
its price falls, thus leading to a smaller liquidity risk premium even if the liquid-
ity risk per se is unchanged.
20Of course, off-the-run Treasuries will mature one or two auction cycles ear-
lier than on-the-run Treasuries with the same maturity, but the yield spreads used
here have already been adjusted for this slight difference in maturity.
21For statistical reasons, the regression of changes of these variables is better
than of levels, as it avoids possible spurious correlations between the levels of the
variables. The actual regression also allows a constant term.
22This is due to data restrictions: The Treasury Department provides disag-
gregate data on outstanding volumes of bills (debt instruments with maturity less
than one year), notes (debt with maturity between two to ten years), and bonds
(debt with maturity longer than ten years).
23As the author cannot find separate data on transaction volumes on 5-
year and 10-year TIPS through primary dealers, the total transaction volume is
used for both 5-year and 10-year regressions even though separate volumes
would be preferable.
24The data are monthly, and a 12-lag autocorrelation is allowed for the residuals. 
25Compared with some other estimates, the estimated sizes of the decline of
liquidity risk premia appear to be small, and should probably be viewed as con-
servative. For example, Carlstrom and Fuerst estimated that the liquidity risk pre-
mium in the 10-year TIPS declined about 85 basis points between the beginning
of 2002 and late 2004 (compared to no more than 10 basis points here). 
26Some market analysts have suggested that this relative decrease in the sup-
ply of longer-term to shorter-term nominal Treasuries may also explain part of
the flattening of the nominal yield curve.
27Some market analysts even speculate that many investors, including pen-
sion funds and insurance companies, may have increased their purchases of
longer-term Treasuries, either in an attempt to meet the future reforms preemp-
tively, or in anticipation of the price improvements when such reform proposals
becomes law. If this is indeed the case, then some of the effect may have already,
at least partially, been reflected in the current yield spreads.
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